Representation and Re-Presentation in Litigation Science by Jasanoff, Sheila
Science as Argument
Late one evening, I phone my son and end up
talking to his wife. My son, a neuroscientist, is
in his laboratory that night, trying to ﬁnish a
grant application due the next day. He might
have to stay there all night, my daughter-in-
law resignedly observes. What he has to do is
time-consuming. He is reformatting the visual
representations of his data, making them more
aesthetic, he hopes, and also more convincing
to the funding body and its referees. Creating
the right sorts of displays is not “doing
science” as people conventionally think of it.
Visualization becomes an issue only after the
experiments are completed and the data
already collected. Yet unless the results can be
shown to others in convincing form, it would
be almost as if the underlying observations had
never been made. Good representations are
essential if a scientist wishes to communicate
ﬁndings beyond the laboratory—to persuade
colleagues, attract sponsors, inform policy-
makers, convince juries, or inspire students.
Another day my teaching assistant tells me
that she has been having a frustrating time
with her work. She is modeling the transport
of atmospheric mercury, and she is trying to
represent what she knows about airborne con-
centrations of the pollutant. She has been pro-
ducing colored maps, using rainbow effects to
shade from one concentration region to
another. Her supervisor thinks this strategy is
not visually intelligible enough. He urges her
to use ﬁve colors, with clear boundaries and no
shading. He is convinced that this technique
will display the information in more under-
standable terms—not only to fellow scientists,
but also to regulators who may eventually set
standards based on the work performed in
their laboratory. My assistant says it is very dif-
ﬁcult to change from one coloring system to
another, but she is trying hard.
These are routine moments in the lives of
working scientists, hardly worth recording, one
may think. But from the standpoint of the law,
they illustrate critically important features of
scientific practice and process. First, these
episodes demonstrate the crucial role of repre-
sentation, more particularly, visual representa-
tion, in the making of scientific arguments.
Second, they display science as a form of com-
municative, persuasive, even argumentative
activity, very similar in these respects to the
law. Third, they illustrate the contingency, or
local speciﬁcity, of some of the choices scien-
tists make in producing representations of nat-
ural phenomena. There is no predetermined,
single right way to make visual images of the
workings of the rat brain or the movements of
mercury in the atmosphere. Fourth, and
ﬁnally, stories such as these make it clear that
science done in laboratories has consequences
in the outside world, affecting social choices
such as ﬂows of funds and formulations of pol-
icy; scientists, even in the so-called ivory towers
of major research universities, are self-
consciously aware of the strategic dimensions
of their work.
That science progresses with more than a
passing nod toward its relations with society is
nothing new, and among social institutions
the law has long attracted scientists’ particular
attention. For more than 200 years, a sizable
component of scientiﬁc activity has been dedi-
cated to meeting the needs of the legal system
in varied ways (Clark and Crawford 1994;
Golan 2004). Scientiﬁc information provides
justification for governmental decisions in
many domains, including health, safety, and
environmental regulation, economic and edu-
cational policy, and national security and
defense. Equally, scientific data are required
from parties seeking a wide range of govern-
mental beneﬁts, from approval of new prod-
ucts to patents on inventions. Not least,
scientiﬁc evidence has become a virtual neces-
sity in conducting both civil and criminal legal
proceedings; the late twentieth century
brought an upsurge in the use of forensic sci-
ence as it did in expert witnessing. Three
widely discussed U.S. Supreme Court deci-
sions of the 1990s, beginning with the land-
mark case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), and followed by
General Electric Co. v. Joiner (1997) and
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael (1999), sig-
naled the legal system’s awareness of its
increasing entanglement with science and the
resulting need to rearticulate the criteria for
admitting expert evidence into the courtroom.
Daubert and its progeny mark, in a sense,
a low-water point in judicial self-esteem con-
cerning the capacity of the legal process to
generate or properly assess scientific knowl-
edge. Doubt is apparent both in Daubert’s
injunction to trial judges to become proactive
gatekeepers against unreliable or irrelevant
evidence—thereby taking important aspects
of fact-finding away from lay juries (Berger
2001)—and in the Court’s admonition that
judges should think like scientists in evaluat-
ing admissibility. Judges, in this view, should
serve as inscription (or, more accurately, rein-
scription) devices, automatically writing sci-
entists’ standards of reliability and validity
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Federal appellate courts have devised several criteria to help judges distinguish between reliable
and unreliable scientiﬁc evidence. The best known are the U.S. Supreme Court’s criteria offered in
1993 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. This article focuses on another criterion,
offered by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, that instructs judges to assign lower credibility to
“litigation science” than to science generated before litigation. In this article I argue that the crite-
rion-based approach to judicial screening of scientific evidence is deeply flawed. That approach
buys into the faulty premise that there are external criteria, lying outside the legal process, by
which judges can distinguish between good and bad science. It erroneously assumes that judges
can ascertain the appropriate criteria and objectively apply them to challenged evidence before liti-
gation unfolds, and before methodological disputes are sorted out during that process. Judicial
screening does not take into account the dynamics of litigation itself, including gaming by the par-
ties and framing by judges, as constitutive factors in the production and representation of knowl-
edge. What is admitted through judicial screening, in other words, is not precisely what a jury
would see anyway. Courts are sites of repeated re-representations of scientiﬁc knowledge. In sum,
the screening approach fails to take account of the wealth of existing scholarship on the produc-
tion and validation of scientiﬁc facts. An unreﬂective application of that approach thus puts courts
at risk of relying upon a “junk science” of the nature of scientiﬁc knowledge. Key words: admissibil-
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[Online 7 November 2007]into their assessments of the evidence
(Jasanoff 2005). This functional rearrange-
ment of trial choreography not only raised the
bar against testimony offered by civil plain-
tiffs, the parties most likely to be disadvan-
taged by Daubert hearings, but also demoted
juries to a subordinate role in fact-ﬁnding. In
Daubert’s epistemological framework, scien-
tists establish the criteria for what counts as
science, and judges are charged with import-
ing these into admissibility decisions; only
after claims pass through the double screen of
judges “thinking like scientists” are juries
entitled to hear testifying experts and weigh
their respective credibility.
On rehearing Daubert, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals continued the trend toward
institutional self-abnegation by questioning the
reliability of litigation-generated science—that
is, science conducted solely in response to
issues raised by a lawsuit. At issue in both
Daubert cases was the previously unresearched
question whether the drug Bendectin ingested
during pregnancy causes birth defects. Judge
Alex Kozinski in effect denied the power of
litigation to generate scientific knowledge
untainted by the interests of the parties [but see
Boden and Ozonoff (2008)]. Instead, he wrote
that testimony “based directly on legitimate,
preexisting research unrelated to the litigation
provides the most persuasive basis for conclud-
ing” that an expert’s opinions are “derived by
the scientiﬁc method” (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1995). Kozinski, like
Justice Harry Blackmun writing for the
Supreme Court’s majority in Daubert, thereby
posited the existence of two types of scientiﬁc
knowledge: on one side, a domain of pure,
unbiased, prelitigation science, characterized by
the use of well-recognized and accredited scien-
tiﬁc methods, in which such processes as peer
review, testing, and replication ensure reliabil-
ity; on the other, a domain of impure, party-
driven, potentially biased “litigation science,”
in which partisan interests and absence of repli-
cation or review by peers undermines the testi-
fying expert’s claims to reliability.
Legal analysts and scholars trained in
science and technology studies (STS) have
rightly criticized the characterizations of both
law and science offered by both Daubert opin-
ions. Students of jury behavior, for example,
question Daubert’s underlying premise of lay
incompetence (Vidmar 1995), which provided
much of the justification for a threshold
screening by judges to keep “junk science” out
of the courtroom (Huber 1991). STS analysts,
for their part, note that the Daubert decisions
rest on ideal-typical assumptions about science
and the scientiﬁc method that are not borne
out by observed scientific activity. Most
important for the present discussion, the sci-
ence needed to resolve legal disputes very often
does not preexist the controversy (Jasanoff
1995), but rather is contingently constructed
to answer case-specific questions that might
never have arisen through pure or paradigm-
generated science, or not in comparable form.
The reasons for such nonexistence are many:
novelty of the issues, regulatory grandfather-
ing, low scientific interest, cost constraints,
simple ignorance. The courtroom thus
becomes not the first but the only forum in
which competing claims of expertise and cred-
ibility can be sorted out (Bal 2005). It is not
surprising, then, that rules of method that
courts have claimed to borrow from science
have been constructed within the processes of
adjudication, as courts articulate and then
transmit such rules from one jurisdiction to
another. For example, the inclination by post-
Daubert federal courts to favor epidemiologic
over other forms of evidence, on the ground
that epidemiology is scientifically preferred,
turns out on close analysis of the Bendectin
cases to be just such a judicial construct
(Edmond and Mercer 2000).
Despite all criticism, however, Daubert
remains the law of the land in the federal
courts, and its narrow holding—that the
Federal Rules of Evidence control admissibil-
ity rather than the 1923 decision in Frye v.
United States—remains unchallenged. Most of
Daubert’s implementation problems fre-
quently arise from two other sources, both
rooted in judicial constructions of how science
works. The first is the rigid and formulaic
application of the criteria of scientiﬁc validity
announced by Justice Blackmun as merely
exemplary: “Many factors will bear on the
inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a
deﬁnitive checklist or test” (Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1993). In practice,
the criteria have operated very much like the
checklist that Blackmun warned against. The
second is the announcement of new interpre-
tive rules, such as Judge Kozinski’s “litigation
science” test, that rest on idealized, misleading,
or misinformed assumptions about the scien-
tiﬁc method. As a result, in attempting to dili-
gently implement Daubert, federal judges have
effectively fallen back on a “junk science” of
how science works.
For those concerned with the quality of
the science used in legal proceedings, it is
important, then, to make sure that courts in
the post-Daubert era rely on images of science
that more accurately reﬂect what is known of
the nature of scientific practice. This article
contributes to that goal by reflecting on the
role of representation in the sciences, both in
and out of the litigation context. By seeing all
scientiﬁc knowledge claims as representations,
courts and analysts of the law will be better
positioned to ask what makes some represen-
tations better or more reliable than others for
purposes of legal fact-ﬁnding. The result may
be a more nuanced application of Daubert’s
core holding: that judges should be reluctant
to admit evidence that satisﬁes no reasonable
warrants of reliability. Understanding science
as a special kind of representation should also
provide defenses against untenable black-and-
white rules that rest on untested judicial
assumptions or, worse, on partisan assertions
by experts. Adjudication, after all, is essentially
a process of evaluating competing representa-
tions. Recognizing that science, too, only rep-
resents reality is a starting point for rethinking
the judicial role in the assessment of litigation-
generated science, and for realigning that role
with the realities of judicial competence.
Observing Science: Impartiality
and Symmetry
Great gains in our understanding of science as
a social process began in the 1970s with an “in
effect” thought experiment that turned into a
wide-ranging research program. Sociologists
and anthropologists asked themselves how the
making of science would look if one emptied
one’s mind of prior conceptions of what sci-
ence is or how it progresses. This meant
divorcing the observation of science-in-the-
making from any overarching theoretical deﬁ-
nitions of the “scientiﬁc method,” such as Karl
Popper’s view, endorsed by the Daubert court,
that what distinguishes, or demarcates, science
from nonscience is falsiﬁability (Popper 1959).
[Citing Popper, the Daubert court observed,
“Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in
determining whether a theory or technique is
scientiﬁc knowledge that will assist the trier of
fact will be whether it can be (and has been)
tested.”] The Popperian doctrine holds that it
may not be possible to verify conclusively
whether a given scientific theory is true, but
that invalid theories can be conclusively falsi-
fied by empirical observations that conflict
with the expected results. For courts con-
fronted with the need to demarcate legitimate
from illegitimate scientiﬁc claims in admissi-
bility decisions, the falsifiability rule, and its
associated practice of testing, seemed a god-
send. After all, it is easy to ask whether a theo-
retical claim is testable or has been tested. But
is falsification through testing how science
actually operates, and can the criterion of falsi-
fiability be meaningfully applied in practice?
How could one answer questions such as these
without observing in detail how working sci-
entists conduct themselves? That is the obser-
vational challenge that professional students of
science increasingly took upon themselves
(Callon 1995).
David Bloor, a philosophically trained
sociologist at the University of Edinburgh, set
forth an inﬂuential programmatic approach to
studies of scientiﬁc knowledge. Known as the
“strong programme” in the sociology of scien-
tiﬁc knowledge (SSK), that approach remains
highly germane to present-day examinations
Jasanoff
124 VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 1 | January 2008 • Environmental Health Perspectivesof scientiﬁc validity in the legal context. Like
Popper, Bloor and his successors in SSK were
also concerned with the demarcation question
that confronts judges in admissibility deci-
sions: what makes an assertion about the
nature of the world genuinely, or adequately,
scientific rather than merely wishful, subjec-
tive, interested, grounded in superstition, or
even deluded? To answer this question, the
strong programme recommended an inductive
and empirical approach, guided by four
methodological principles:
• Causality: examine the conditions (psycho-
logical, social, and cultural) that bring about
claims to a certain kind of knowledge.
• Impartiality: examine successful as well as
unsuccessful knowledge claims.
• Symmetry: use the same types of explana-
tions for successful and unsuccessful knowl-
edge claims.
• Reflexivity: apply the same approach to
sociology itself (i.e., to the investigator’s
own claims to knowledge) (Bloor 1976).
Two of these principles, impartiality and
symmetry, are of particular relevance in recon-
sidering how to interpret and implement
Daubert. The impartiality principle in SSK
presumes that much can be learned about how
science works by looking at scientific claims
that never established themselves as true.
Speciﬁcally, one learns more about the scien-
tiﬁc method by observing “science in action”
(Latour 1987)—that is, how scientists sort out
good from bad science in their actual prac-
tice—than by presuming to know in advance
the constituents of that method (or those
methods). The symmetry principle instructs
the sociologist of scientific knowledge to be
especially cautious about invoking nature (or,
indeed, any type of explanatory variable, e.g.,
economic interest) one-sidedly, only to explain
why a particular claim is true or false. After all,
both sides in any scientific dispute need to
contend with nature, and both are driven by
multiple interests. The challenge for the SSK
scholar is to determine why one side more
than the other is deemed to have created the
right representation of nature.
In part, the foundation for the symmetry
rule is historical: during the course of a scien-
tific dispute, the participants themselves do
not know which side has the right answer. It is
only after the conflict settles that truth
becomes fixed in any sense, both for those
involved and for future inquirers. Even then,
scientiﬁc methods and ﬁndings are best seen as
only provisional; what science “knows” at any
given point is simply the best knowledge avail-
able to a particular community working in a
particular paradigm, with particular assump-
tions, instruments, and techniques. In effect,
then, the symmetry principle enjoins socio-
logical inquirers not to think they know more
about a dispute than scientists do themselves
while that dispute is still in progress. Anything
else would put the sociologist in the risky posi-
tion of speaking from a higher plateau of
knowledge than those engaged in producing
the very knowledge whose success the sociolo-
gist is trying to understand.
The parallels to litigation should be clear.
In litigation settings, as in the scientiﬁc con-
troversies that SSK scholars study, we also
encounter “science in action.” As in live scien-
tific controversies, courts observe science in
the making, because the facts needed to
resolve legal disputes, and even the methods
by which such facts might be ascertained, are
seldom already out there in the existing scien-
tiﬁc literature (Jasanoff 1995). Like the acade-
mic sociologist, the judicial fact ﬁnder is also
interested in demarcating the claims that can
be reliably relied on from those that are not
sufﬁciently grounded in acceptable standards
of scientific inquiry. To be sure, the law’s
stake in demarcation is more explicitly nor-
mative and consequential: In the courtroom,
reliable science serves as an aid to determining
how disputes ought to be resolved, and hence
to deciding who wins and who loses. And
although historians and social scientists can
afford to stand apart and observe scientists at
work, judges cannot, because legal rules actu-
ally influence the production and testing of
knowledge. But the potential intellectual traps
are similar for both legal and sociological
inquiry into the nature of science. The mis-
take, in law as in sociology, is to believe that
there are pregiven, determinate standards,
extrinsic to what scientists themselves would
invoke when confronted by speciﬁc, compet-
ing claims. In effect, the best way to sort out
the relative strength of expert claims in litiga-
tion is to adopt the SSK scholar’s impartial
stance, and watch the opposing parties
attempt to defend their positions. The ideal
trial situation should in this respect imitate
the ideal scientiﬁc laboratory.
From the standpoint of science studies,
Daubert is ﬂawed because it causes the judicial
fact-ﬁnder to abandon both impartiality and
symmetry, and to review challenged evidence
without allowing it to engage in conversation
with the challenger’s evidentiary claims. In the
day-to-day practice of science, it is precisely the
negotiation between competing viewpoints
that discloses ﬂaws in arguments and gives rise
to preferred rules of method. An interesting
parallel in the legal context can be found in the
pre-Daubert history of the admissibility of
DNA typing in U.S. courtrooms. There, the
relative asymmetry of power and resources
between the parties initially favored prosecu-
tors, who successfully introduced DNA evi-
dence, citing its near-infallibility, in hundreds
of cases before they met substantial challenge
in People v. Castro (1989). In that case, the ﬁrst
to deny admissibility, major flaws in the
production of allegedly incontrovertible
evidence were uncovered when expert wit-
nesses for both sides staged an impromptu,
mini-scientiﬁc controversy to resolve the issues
between them. That debate, in turn, prompted
a more systematic look at the foundations of
DNA testing’s infallibility claims and led to
methodological standardization and reform.
Daubert’s one-sided scrutiny sacriﬁces that
kind of revealing dynamic in the interests of
efﬁciency: Judicial denial of admissibility short-
circuits potentially expensive trials. But what is
the epistemological basis of the activist review
that Daubert calls for? Unlike SSK researchers
and other professional students of the scientiﬁc
enterprise, judges are not subject to peer
scrutiny or updating with respect to their mas-
tery of what is, in the end, an extensive domain
of philosophical, sociological, and political
scholarship. Rather, Daubert and its progeny
almost invite judges to invoke criteria that
derive from their personal understandings, or
misunderstandings, of how science works,
thereby positioning the judiciary as virtually
unreviewable SSK experts (Jasanoff 2001).
Daubert accords to judicial folk-knowledge
(i.e., cultural knowledge shared by judges)
about the scientiﬁc process a privileged, almost
insulated, position that it does not grant to the
most eminent of expert witnesses.
All this is not to say that litigation is ever
the ideal laboratory for testing scientiﬁc truth
claims. Bias and distortion can indeed enter
in many ways into the production of science
for courtroom use, as they can into the pro-
duction of science writ large (Krimsky 2003),
and more aggressive judicial gatekeeping
would be well warranted if it could serve as an
effective filter against potential excesses of
party-generated expertise. At the same time,
judicial power should not be misused to pre-
vent illuminating courtroom exchanges over
scientific methods or to block the develop-
ment of new information through litigation.
How can Daubert’s legitimate interest in
cleansing litigation of outrageous expert
claims be balanced against the countervailing
risk of letting judicial expertise function as its
own form of unreviewable “junk science”? To
ﬁnd a way out of that dilemma, let us turn to
the influential body of work that treats sci-
ence as a mode of representation, speciﬁcally,
as a set of strategies for representing nature.
The Representational Turn
With increasingly rare exceptions, scientists
today can neither see the natural phenomena
they claim to be investigating nor directly show
them to others. No human eye has seen cli-
mate change or biodiversity loss; an oncogene,
the human genome, or the complete array of
chemical elements; schizophrenia or hyperten-
sion; the ozone hole, the eye of a hurricane, or
the AIDS virus. Some of these, such as the
Representation in litigation science
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the virus that causes AIDS, are visually familiar
to us through complex magniﬁcation, photo-
graphic, and coloration techniques. Medical
conditions, such as hypertension or schizo-
phrenia, are made palpable through techniques
of measurement or expert diagnosis that
redescribe the pathology in standardized terms,
including numerical scales and specialist lan-
guage. Many scientiﬁcally known objects, such
as the human genome or the array of chemi-
cals, are rendered “visible” only through trans-
lation into readable visual forms: the familiar
ACTG alphabet of DNA’s base pairs, or the
classic periodic table of the elements. Still oth-
ers, such as climate change and biodiversity
loss, are known only through charts and graphs
that convey some pieces of a more complex
whole, such as the now-famous readings of sea-
sonal rises and falls in atmospheric carbon
dioxide concentrations at the Mauna Loa
observatory in Hawaii.
Science, as Bruno Latour most clearly
demonstrated in his influential early work
(Latour 1990), can usefully be thought of as a
conglomerate of inscriptions, or visual records,
which make knowledge portable across spa-
tially and culturally unconnected domains.
When representations are successful, in the
sense that no one any longer contests their
basic meaning, they become in Latour’s words
“immutable mobiles” (Latour 1990). They
move across time and space without con-
stantly raising new questions about what they
are or what they mean. Of course, it may take
decades, even centuries, for bits of science to
become immutable in this way. Throughout
the process of creating stable representations
(or, perhaps more accurately, stable techniques
of representation), conﬂicts abound: over the
adequacy of models and the accuracy of meas-
urements, the right ways of reading inscrip-
tions, and the wider meanings that can be
extrapolated from such records, taken alone or
brought into interaction with one another.
For many years, science studies research has
documented in microscopic detail the kinds of
work needed to convert these sorts of natural
objects and phenomena into stable forms that
can be seen, manipulated, and used for scien-
tific communication—in contexts ranging
from grant applications to expert evidence.
But eventually, representations become stan-
dard, at least within speciﬁc domains of prac-
tice. Ken Alder’s account of a seven-year
controversy in revolutionary France to stan-
dardize the meter is an example (Alder 2002).
No one any longer seriously questions the
length of the meter in ordinary use, any more
than anyone contests the biological meaning
of sperm or stegosaurus, systolic blood
pressure, or sickle cell anemia.
In the contemporary world, the law is
very often implicated in stabilizing scientific
representations. Legal proceedings serve
in effect as “agonistic fields” (Latour and
Woolgar 1986) or fields of contestation, in
which experts debate the merits of competing
representations and the techniques that pro-
duced them. New knowledge often emerges as
a result of this process, both about the nature
of disputed phenomena and about the
cause–effect relationships of concern to the
law. Medical diagnostic criteria for syndromes
such as posttraumatic stress disorder, for exam-
ple, arose hand in hand with the efforts of suf-
ferers to gain compensation for such conditions
or to use them in criminal defense (Young
1995). Much that we know today about the
toxicity of such chemicals as dioxin or the long-
term health effects of radiation, asbestos, and
methyl isocyanate (the gas released from a
Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, in
1984) was learned in the form of evidence gen-
erated by plaintiffs’ experts in tort litigation.
The conclusion that silicone gel breast implants
do not cause immune system disorders was
reached after more than 20 years of litigation-
driven science (Saul 2006). Forensic sciences
form an entire subﬁeld of technical knowledge
that owes its very existence, not to mention its
objects, instruments, and methods of analysis,
to the knowledge-generating interplay of
science and the law.
The history of forensic DNA typing illus-
trates these dynamics especially well. A DNA
ﬁngerprint is a scientiﬁc inscription of special
utility in law enforcement: It represents a per-
son’s identity as a conﬁguration of parallel lines
resembling a somewhat smudgy supermarket
bar graph, with bands of varying thickness cor-
responding to the presence of particular alleles.
These ﬁngerprints are deemed virtually unique,
because the chances that the same allelic pat-
tern will be found in two people who are not
identical twins are vanishingly small. When
DNA ﬁngerprints were ﬁrst introduced as evi-
dence in the 1980s, prosecutors used them not
only to match a suspect’s DNA to DNA traces
found at the crime scene, but also to support
estimates of the probability or, more properly,
improbability of an accidental match or false
positive. Dizzyingly low numbers, coupled
with unshakeable expert conﬁdence about the
validity of the matches, at ﬁrst concealed the
tacit judgments that were inevitably involved
in reading the so-called ﬁngerprints. For exam-
ple, experts sometimes declared matches
between crime scene samples and suspect sam-
ples without explaining why they had ignored
the presence of an extra bar in one ﬁngerprint,
or the systematic displacement of bars between
two allegedly identical fingerprints. It also
emerged that probabilistic estimates initially
had not taken into account the possibility of
reduced allelic variation within ethnic sub-
groups, a factor that increases the likelihood of
false positives. People v. Castro (1989),
discussed above, helped bring these issues into
the open. It took years of legal contestation,
two expert committee reports from the
National Academy of Sciences (National
Research Council 1992, 1996), and extensive
standardization by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and state crime laboratories to
achieve a near-uniform national standard of
good practice for forensic DNA testing. Judged
by this standard, the practices used to convict
defendants in the early cases clearly fell short,
but it took an evolutionary, law-driven process
to reveal and correct the most egregious ﬂaws.
Another context in which litigation has
helped to push forward a particular form of
scientific representation is brain imaging
(Dumit 2003). In this case, the pressure to
use a new technology originated partly in the
criminal defense community. Lawyers sought
to establish with the aid of brain scans that
their clients were acting in a state of dimin-
ished mental capacity. A noted case was that
of John W. Hinckley Jr., the man who in
1981 shot President Ronald Reagan and three
other people in order to impress the actress
Jodie Foster, with whom he had become
obsessed through her role in Taxi Driver
(Dumit 2003). In Roper v. Simmons (2005),
evidence from brain scans was introduced by
scientific and professional amici curiae,
including the American Medical Association
and the American Psychiatric Association
(AMA, APA et al. 2004), to establish that
adolescent brains do not function at the same
levels as those of adults. These submissions
played a part in persuading the Supreme
Court to declare the death penalty unconsti-
tutional for persons younger than age 18,
although some have argued that the neurosci-
entiﬁc evidence offered to the Court was itself
immature and should not have been advanced
as a basis for decisions of constitutional signif-
icance (Schaffer 2004).
Both DNA ﬁngerprints and brain images
prominently involve visual representations of
biological facts, but scientiﬁc representations
can take many other forms, not all pictorial or
graphic. Another particularly persuasive mode
of representation is statistical. The power of
statistics derives from aggregation, which
allows signals to be detected that might have
escaped notice if perceived only as random
events (as in the case of cancer caused by
diethylstilbestrol, or DES), and from regres-
sion, which allows putative cause–effect rela-
tionships to be either demonstrated (as in the
case of passive smoking) or discredited (as in
the case of Bendectin) by comparing large
numbers of cases. So important has statistical
evidence become in litigation that the Federal
Judicial Center includes a chapter on that topic
in its Reference Manual on Scientiﬁc Evidence
(2000). As in other areas of litigation science,
however, appropriate statistical methods often
Jasanoff
126 VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 1 | January 2008 • Environmental Health Perspectivesdo not preexist the dispute in question, but
develop only as parties in a controversy
actively sort out which end points, which
causal factors, and which populations should
be subjected to statistical investigation in the
ﬁrst place. Of course, such activities may fail
to support claims brought forward by the
plaintiffs’ experts, but by shining a brighter
light on the evidence, and by sometimes trig-
gering reanalyses of older data, they may also
reveal methodological flaws and previously
unsuspected correlations. An example is the
dispute over the increased risk of suicidality
(suicidal thinking and behavior) in children
and adolescents caused by antidepressant med-
ications that were once considered safe for use.
On 15 October 2004, following years of liti-
gation and complaints by victims’ families, the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration issued a
public health advisory on these drugs on the
basis of a meta-analysis of 24 studies including
4,400 patients (U.S. Food and Drug
Administration 2004).
Forensic Representation:
The Rules of the Game
Science, we have seen, necessarily involves
argument and representation in order to be
persuasive. Yet, as all agree, the representation
of science in the courtroom occurs under
rules that are crucially different from those of
the scientific workplace. Critics of the legal
system frequently fall into the trap of asym-
metry in characterizing those differences.
They assume that representation within the
sciences is neutral, impartial, and objective;
by contrast, legal representation is seen as
deviant (“junk science”), because it incorpo-
rates such distorting factors as the interests of
parties, their experts, and their legal counsel.
Or, like Judge Kozinski, critics see science as
governed by a monolithic set of methods and
practices, such as universal standards of trans-
parency and peer review; by comparison, “liti-
gation science” seems to fall short.
Such oversimplified analysis not only
misrepresents the nature of litigation science
but also endangers the productive use of large
amounts of science generated in the course of
legal proceedings. All scientific claims-mak-
ing, after all, is driven by interests of varying
kinds—intellectual, economic, institutional,
and cultural. Indeed, much science produced
to serve the needs of public policy, particu-
larly in areas of health, safety, and environ-
mental regulation, is generated by private
actors who have substantial stakes in the out-
comes of the policy process. Moreover, a
great deal of published science passes through
only the most superﬁcial peer scrutiny and is
never tested, replicated, or even cited.
Scientific fraud and misconduct are well-
known indicators of those realities (Broad
and Wade 1985).
Rather than contrasting litigation science
with a nonexistent ideal of research science, a
more fruitful approach to the law’s demarca-
tion problem is to ask what is special about
the forensic representation of science, and
how that stylized form of representation dif-
fers from conventional modes of scientific
representation. For that inquiry, it is useful to
think of litigation science not as an intellectu-
ally different kind of enterprise from research
science, but rather as a performance subject to
distinctive rules of the game. Empirically, we
can ask in what respects the courtroom func-
tions differently from the laboratory or the
scientiﬁc journal as a theater for staging scien-
tiﬁc representations. That move allows us to
focus on the actual strategies of presentation
and representation used in litigation. It
enables us to see that scientiﬁc representation
is not merely the product of more or less well-
intentioned experts submitting to more or less
effective cross-examination before more or
less competent juries. Looking at evidence-
giving as a kind of performance sheds light on
the critically important roles of judges and
lawyers in configuring—or framing—the
manner in which evidence is presented. It
provides a bridge to delineating more pre-
cisely the difference between forensic and
other forms of scientiﬁc representation.
Judges play a crucial role in framing the
presentation of expert evidence throughout a
trial, far beyond the conduct of the admissi-
bility screening. As custodians of order and
routine in the courtroom, judges can influ-
ence not only what but how evidence is
brought forward, and who interprets it for
the jury. Thus, in the 1982 Hinckley trial,
the presiding judge, Barrington D. Parker,
reluctant to overpower the jury with visual
evidence of the defendant’s alleged insanity,
at ﬁrst rejected the brain scans introduced by
the defense. Later, after he admitted the scans
as relevant, Parker directed them to be pro-
jected so far away and on such a small screen
that the message was quite possibly lost in
translation (Dumit 2003). In the 1995 mur-
der trial of O.J. Simpson, Judge Lance Ito
determined that the DNA test protocol used
by Cellmark Laboratories, the laboratory
used by the prosecution, was appropriate and
did not need to be offset by other techniques
selected by the defense. He accordingly
denied a defense request to split the available
blood samples to permit independent testing
to be conducted (Jasanoff 1998b). Ito also
excluded expert testimony seeking to inter-
pret video evidence for the jury, arguing that
any viewer could make sense of such testi-
mony unaided by experts, because it appeals
directly to people’s communal sense of sight.
The judge treated the videotape as a self-
contained, objective record needing no
further explication by expert witnesses.
But video testimony has been interpreted
by experts in other cases, and those interpreta-
tions have sometimes proved extremely conse-
quential. The 1992 and 1993 trials of Los
Angeles police officers in the beating of
Rodney King provide a telling example. In the
ﬁrst trial, the prosecution presented a videotape
shot by a chance bystander showing King
being brutally beaten by a group of policemen;
like Judge Ito in the Simpson trial, the prose-
cutors thought the tape spoke for itself and
needed no further commentary. Defense
lawyers, however, called upon Sergeant Charles
Duke of the Los Angeles Police Department
(LAPD) to interpret the video as an expert on
the use of force. Duke’s testimony in effect
translated into the language of professional
judgment what looked to the untutored eye to
be an extremely violent beating of one man by
several others. Within the context of police
practice, Duke argued, it was King’s bodily
movements that were aggressive, and the beat-
ing was the legitimate response of officers
trained to respond forcefully to such acts of
aggression (Goodwin 1994). Interviewed on
Court TV, a defense lawyer said that the object
had been to show that “[w]hat looks like
uncontrolled . . . brutality and random violence
is indeed a very disciplined and controlled effort
to take Mr. King into custody” (Goodwin
1994). The attempt to professionalize the read-
ing of the video was successful, and all four
LAPD officers charged with using excessive
force were acquitted. In a federal trial a year
later, two of the same ofﬁcers were found guilty
of having violated Rodney King’s civil rights,
on the basis of the same visual evidence.
These episodes illustrate the importance of
the courtroom as a performative space in which
strategies for excluding or mobilizing expertise
can change the very way juries perceive the evi-
dence. Of course, such performances are by no
means restricted to legal settings. In science as
well as in law, experts are relied on to reduce
ambiguity, to make it appear as if only one
story can be told on the basis of the available
evidence. For this purpose, in science as in the
law, experts must pattern as impartial and
objective truth-tellers: in the agonistic ﬁelds of
science as of law, the persuasiveness of an argu-
ment depends on garnering maximum credibil-
ity for it, while sowing doubt and uncertainty
about any alternative interpretations. This
dynamic plays out on what I have called the
“game board of expertise” (Jasanoff 1998a).
The game is symbolically enacted on a board
deﬁned by two axes labeled, respectively, experi-
ence and objectivity (Figure 1). The aim is to
position one’s own claims of expertise as high as
possible on both axes, while seeking to demote
the opponent’s claims.
On this game board, various moves can be
used to move experts away from the nonexpert
quadrant, defined as least experienced and
Representation in litigation science
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 1 | January 2008 127Jasanoff
128 VOLUME 116 | NUMBER 1 | January 2008 • Environmental Health Perspectives
least objective, toward the quadrant of the
expert-scientist, defined as most experienced
and most objective—or vice versa. Some of
these strategies are widely used in both scien-
tiﬁc and legal settings, although under differ-
ent constraints and in relation to different
audiences. Thus, to maximize credibility along
the experience axis, an expert can be posi-
tioned as a mainstream member of a recog-
nized professional group, well versed in that
group’s discourses and codes of practice; in
legal terms, this strategy is similar to meeting
the “general acceptance” test articulated in
Frye v. United States (1923) and reiterated in
Daubert. Along the objectivity axis, credibility-
enhancing moves may include meeting tests of
the kind articulated in Daubert that help to
demonstrate the scientific validity of the
expert’s approach to generating new knowl-
edge. Although the focus on this axis is on
method rather than experience, the goal,
again, is to show that the methods themselves
are not ad hoc or case speciﬁc but are recog-
nized as valid and credible by a body of peers.
In science as in law, claims to both experi-
ential and scientiﬁc expertise can be negated
through allegations of subjectivity, bias, fraud,
and error. In neither context can one expect
peer judgments of competence or validity to
be consistent or foolproof. The results of par-
ticular credibility-building processes will
depend on who is deemed to be a peer and
how carefully such persons exercise their criti-
cal faculties. In short, even within the sci-
ences, there is no scientiﬁc means of assessing
the credibility of expert representations.
Perhaps the most striking difference
between the dynamics of establishing expert
credibility in law and in science ﬂows from the
factually speciﬁc and ad hoc character of many
legal proceedings. Unlike “normal science,”
which by deﬁnition operates within the con-
straints of a paradigm, or set of communally
recognized rules and practices, the technical
questions generated by the law often seem to
come out of nowhere, and sometimes to go
nowhere, in the sense of providing starting
points for new scientiﬁc inquiry. It is in these
one-off or stand-alone cases that the law’s tech-
nical fact-ﬁnding capacity is at its most vulner-
able, because expertise then is constructed
entirely within the four corners of the legal
process. Sergeant Duke’s role in the first
Rodney King trial graphically illustrates this
point. Even this nonscientist practitioner could
be made to look expert, as a person possessing
special skills in diagnosing and analyzing a par-
ticular kind of problem (in this case, the use of
excessive force by the police). In a context such
as this, there is no external world of practice
that can be referred to for validation; the law
can only look inward upon itself as it attempts
to determine what counts as relevant expertise
and who counts as an authoritative expert.
Drawing Lessons: 
Rethinking Demarcation
It follows from all this that the model of judge-
made demarcation proposed in Daubert
and further elaborated by Judge Kozinski
in Daubert II (Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1995) is seriously defec-
tive. Both decisions buy into the faulty premise
that there are exogenous criteria, lying outside
the legal process, by which judges can distin-
guish between good and bad science. Both
uncritically assume that judges will be able to
ascertain these criteria and objectively apply
them to challenged evidence without allowing
controversies to unfold and methodological
disputes be sorted out in the process. Neither
takes into account the dynamics of litigation
itself, including gaming by the parties and
framing by judges, as constitutive factors in the
production and representation of knowledge,
so that admissibility operates as only the ﬁrst
step in the process of re-representing scientiﬁc
knowledge for courtroom use; what is admit-
ted, in other words, is not precisely what a jury
sees, as became clear in the Hinckley trial. And
neither opinion is informed by the wealth of
existing scholarship on the production and val-
idation of scientiﬁc facts. An unreﬂective appli-
cation of the Daubert criteria thus puts courts
at risk of producing and applying a “junk sci-
ence” of the nature of scientiﬁc knowledge.
How could courts do better? One
approach consistent with the symmetry princi-
ple in the strong programme of the sociology
of scientiﬁc knowledge would be to let the par-
ties themselves do more of the work of demar-
cation, with judges acting as referees between
the parties rather than as custodians and
enforcers of transcendental standards of good
scientiﬁc practice. Litigation science, after all, is
a particular form of science-in-the-making. If
the criteria for generating valid and relevant
science are not available in advance, but need
to be worked out in the very process of estab-
lishing case-specific facts, then courts might
seek to promote good practices by intervening
earlier in that process, through well-designed
pretrial agreements. Judicial power clearly
extends to orchestrating the relevant conversa-
tions between or among parties to a science-
intensive controversy, thereby brokering the
design of improved methods and protocols to
ﬁll in gaps in the evidence. Among the issues
that parties might be asked to resolve in pretrial
proceedings are the following:
• What new or additional information is
needed?
• What needs to be done to obtain it; for
example, what protocols and standards of
proof are appropriate?
• How study results should be reviewed?
• What should be done with suggestive but
inconclusive evidence?
Judicial involvement in such negotiations
could include the safeguarding of certain tra-
ditional concerns for fairness that were over-
looked in Daubert’s “thinking like a scientist”
mandate. For example, in pretrial discussions,
judges could seek actively to ensure that all
parties with interests in the proceedings are
represented and have a chance to bring their
expertise to the bargaining table. The issue of
costs could be explicitly addressed, and courts
could impose equitable rules for sharing the
cost of developing new evidence—taking into
account the reasons why such knowledge was
not available from the outset. Similarly, pro-
cedures for peer reviewing new studies could
be worked out under judicial supervision, and
agreements could be made about how to
reach closure in the event that studies prove
inconclusive. None of this would be easy, and
adding such processes at the front end of liti-
gation might entail very considerable expense.
At the same time, such pretrial activity might
reduce the ultimate cost of litigation, while
improving the quality of science generated
through the adversary process.
Judicial refereeing of litigation science-in-
the-making would have the further advantage
of acknowledging that lawsuits today serve less
as testing grounds for competing claims than
as devices for prompting the discovery, pro-
duction, and assessment of new knowledge. As
the cost of litigation spirals, trials play a less
and less prominent role in the workings of
American law (Galanter 2004). This means
that the greatest part of dispute resolution,
including most debate over the quality and
sufﬁciency of scientiﬁc evidence, occurs out-
side the framework of the trial; yet, the styl-
ized drama of trial advocacy and its potential
for distortion continue to dominate the think-










































Deconstructionscience, including Justice Blackmun in
Daubert. That error of emphasis could be
avoided by shifting attention away from
admissibility decisions, which ﬁgure in only a
small fraction of lawsuits, to a more balanced
and symmetrical consideration of the strengths
and weaknesses of the available evidence.
Opening the Gates to
Litigation Science—Judiciously
In retrospect, Daubert’s gatekeeping metaphor
appears to have misconceived both the timing
and the appropriate nature of judicial interven-
tion into the production of litigation-related
scientiﬁc knowledge. Daubert and its progeny
conceived of scientiﬁc and technical expert tes-
timony almost as an assault on the courtroom:
the innermost citadel of the law. Like zealous
custodians barricading the fortress gates against
barbarian invaders, judges in the post-Daubert
era were empowered to shut the courtroom
gates to expert testimony that they deemed
irrelevant or unreliable. In carrying out their
mandate from the Supreme Court, federal
judges found themselves in the unenviable
position of serving in effect as final, largely
unreviewable experts on what constitutes “the
scientiﬁc method.”
By looking at science as a form of persua-
sive representation, and by importing the
ideas of impartiality and symmetry from the
sociology of scientiﬁc knowledge, we can radi-
cally reconceptualize the judicial role in rela-
tion to scientific evidence: from gatekeeping
to refereeing. As referees of science-in-the-
making, judges would focus on the process
through which litigation science is generated
rather than on its validity or invalidity. They
would be in a position to structure agree-
ments among the parties that would be most
conducive to producing relevant and reliable
knowledge. With an eye on the dynamics of
knowledge production, particularly on the
game board of expertise, judges could allow
the disputing parties themselves to identify
and resolve their epistemological differences
in an orderly fashion. Not least, judicial refer-
eeing might ensure that the costs of produc-
ing missing information and the burdens of
uncertainty would be equitably distributed.
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